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Abstract:  
Market discipline in banking requires that explicit and implicit insurance schemes for financial 
sector firms are limited, and that the lack of insurance of important stakeholders is credible. This 
credibility cannot be achieved without transparent, predictable procedures for distress resolution 
for banks, including explicit rules for the liquidation of insolvent banks. We find that very few 
European countries have explicit procedures for dealing with problem banks. The propositions 
tested in this paper are that the credibility of non-insurance in European banking depends 
strongly on (i) the degree of coverage of deposit insurance schemes, and (2) on the existence of 
enforceable rules that enhance the credibility of non-insurance of groups of stakeholders.in bank. 
The proxy used for credibility of non-insurance in Europe is the probability of banking crisis. 
Finding a U-shaped relation between the probabiity of banking crisis and the coverage of explicit 
deposit insurance we derive the degree of coverage that minimizes the probability of crisis in 
Western and Eastern Europe. 
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1. Introduction 
The potential role of market discipline in the regulatory and supervisory framework for the 
financial sector has received increasing attention in recent years.  While many academics have 
emphasized market discipline for a long time,1 regulatory bodies until recently have viewed their 
own activities as substitutes for market discipline in the banking sector in particular.  The Basel 
Committee’s recent proposal for a new Capital Accord for Credit Institutions (Basel II) 
represents a deviation from this view in that it considers discipline as the Third Pillar of the 
Capital Adequacy Framework.  Although the actual proposal does not go far, its view of market 
discipline as an integral aspect of the regulatory framework – and one that can be enhanced by 
regulatory measures – represents a break in regulatory philosophy. 
       Capital requirements may contribute to market discipline themselves by forcing banks to 
risk shareholder capital in lending activities. This disciplinary effect presumes that shareholders 
do not perceive themselves as implicitly protected by potential bail-outs in case of bank failures.  
      Many academics have argued for the inclusion of mandatory subordinated debt in the capital 
requirements in order to strengthen market discipline per se, and to provide information to 
supervisors about the financial health of banks.2  Similarly, partial deposit insurance schemes 
could contribute to the awareness of the risk of bank failures. Others emphasize the role of 
regulation and supervision within a strong institutional environment in coping with the moral 
hazard induced by explicit and implicit guarantees of banks’ creditors. (See, for example, 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004) 
          One aspect of market discipline related to the motivation for this paper is the issue of 
credibility of non-insurance of subordinated debt holders, other non-insured depositors, and 
shareholders. For a group of creditors to be convincingly non-insured, explicit and implicit 
insurance schemes for financial sector firms need to be limited, and each creditor group must 
know the order of priority of its claim in case of bank failure. Thus, transparency of distress 
                                                 
1 The “narrow banking” proposal (Litan, 1987 and Pierce, 1991) represents one attempt to enhance market discipline 
for credit institutions. 
2 The idea of using subordinated debt as an instrument of disciplining banks goes back to the 1980s, in particular to 
proposals made in the U.S. by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1983) and by Benston, Eisenbeis, 
Horvitz, Kane and Kaufman (1986). A more recent elaboration can be found in Calomiris (1999). The idea was part 
of a joint statement by a sub-group of the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committees of Europe, Japan, and the U.S. 
(1999) and of Europe, Japan, Latin America, and the U.S. (2001), a statement by the European Shadow Financial 
Regulatory Committee (2000), and it was a key, specific element in recent proposals from the U.S. Shadow 
Financial Regulatory Committee (2000 and 2001). 
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resolution procedures by means of ex ante rules and enforcement powers is a requirement for 
market discipline. Without credible non-insurance stake-holders need not worry about the 
probability of bank failure, and banks will not compete for depositors funds by striving to be the 
best risk evaluators and managers.  
      In this paper we discuss bank crisis resolution procedures in Europe and test empirically the 
hypothesis that market discipline in Europe is enhanced by the existence of credibly non-insured 
creditors of banks. We argue that the credibility of non-insurance depends strongly on the degree 
of coverage of deposit insurance schemes, and on the existence of transparent, institutionally 
supported distress resolution procedures for banks, including explicit procedures for the 
liquidation of insolvent banks. As in Angkinand and Wihlborg (2005) we expect there to be an 
optimal degree of coverage of deposit insurance that maximizes market discipline and minimizes 
the probability of banking crisis. 
        The relevance of this paper within the framework for analysis of transparency set out in the 
introductory chapter, lies in the relation between the rules and regulation of financial institutions 
and the cost of capital of non-financial firms. The regulatory and legal framework for financial 
institutions and its transparency affect the level of, as well as the relative, cost of debt by 
influencing the incentives of bankers to manage and price credit risk in an efficient manner. 
      In the following, reasons for the increasing attention to market discipline within the 
regulatory framework and the role of insolvency procedures are discussed in Section 2. We 
describe briefly the existing (lack of) procedures for dealing with banks in distress in the EU in 
Section 3. In Section 4 we develop the model to be tested and specific hypotheses. We test 
whether the probability of banking crisis in a country falls as the credibility of non-insurance 
increases. The data described in Section 5 covers 17 Western European countries between 1985 
and 2003. In this section the proxy for credibility of non-insurance is explained. We also test 
whether the quality of institutions in the 17 countries affect credibility. The empirical results are 
discussed in Section 6. The relation between probabiity of banking crisis and explicit deposit 
insurance schemes is described for Western and Eastern European countries. Conclusions follow 
in Section 7. 
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2. The Role of Market Discipline and Insolvency Procedures3 
Commercial banking has long been considered special because of a perceived high risk of 
market failure, and because most creditors are explicitly or implicitly insured to safeguard 
against losses in case banks fail. The rationale for this insurance is banks’ role in the payment 
system and the risk of contagious bank runs. Without going into the economic validity of the risk 
of bank runs and contagion, it is a fact that supervisory authorities and governments in all 
countries offer a degree of insurance of banks’ creditors. There is explicit deposit insurance in 
many countries, and expected bailouts imply a degree of implicit insurance. This implicit 
insurance may be extended to shareholders as well. 
      The insurance of banks’ or other financial institutions’ creditors implies that the latter need 
not monitor risks. If, in addition, the insurance is not priced, then banks have incentives to 
deliberately take on high risk-high return assets.4 Furthermore, under any system wherein banks 
do not compete by means of risk evaluation skills there is a high likelihood that these skills will 
be “under-developed” since banks tend to resort to volume competition rather than quality and 
price competition. Thereby, the financial system as a whole may fail to take important risks into 
consideration even if bankers do not have the explicit intention to accept excessively risky assets. 
Capital requirements in excess of the willingly held equity capital are intended to ensure that 
shareholders have a stake in all projects, and, thereby, to reduce incentives for risk-taking. The 
capital requirement for a particular asset determines its cost of capital for a bank. Thus, if assets 
with different risk-return characteristics have the same capital requirement, banks favor those 
assets that offer a relatively high expected rate of return. They can engage in “risk arbitrage” and 
choose relatively risky assets offering the highest expected return among those with a certain 
cost of capital. The Basel I Capital Adequacy Rules (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
1988) have been criticized severely for having too few asset risk classes “risk-buckets”. Thereby, 
Basel I provides incentives for risk arbitrage. 
The regulatory dilemma that the Basel Committee has had to struggle with is that if 
supervisors specify risk buckets that are too broad as in Basel I, then a bank’s expertise can be 
used for risk arbitrage, while if they specify risk buckets too narrowly, then the incentives for 
                                                 
3 This section is based on Benink and Wihlborg (2002) 
4 See, for example, Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) and Freixas and Rochet (1997) for expanded treatments of the 
economics of bank regulation. 
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banks to develop expertise in risk assessment--their presumed comparative advantage—would be 
weakened. 
        The proposed solution to the regulatory dilemma of either allowing regulatory arbitrage 
with broad risk buckets, or removing incentives for banks to develop risk-assessment expertise, 
is to allow banks to use their own internal ratings as the basis for risk-weighting of assets. 
          Basel II (Basel Committee, 2004) allows relatively sophisticated, international banks to 
use internal ratings of loans as a basis for capital requirements. Any approach taken by a bank to 
evaluate risk must be evaluated and accepted by the bank’s supervisory authority. 
    Opportunities for risk arbitrage may exist under an “internal ratings standard” as well, 
because risk weights are based on banks’ private information rather than on external, verifiable 
variables. A major problem facing the supervisors is to check the truthfulness of even estimates 
of probabilities of default. Even the banks face great difficulties to translate their own ratings 
into probabilities of default. Both the European Commission and the Basel Committee recognize 
the potential scope for “gaming and manipulation” within an Internal Ratings standard as the one 
proposed in Basel II.  
Two “pillars” of the capital adequacy framework, supervision and market discipline, carry the 
weight of having to limit risk excessive risk-taking and raise the consciousness and quality of 
risk assessment in the banking community. Under Basel II most of the burden of controlling 
banks’ internal risk assessment procedures is placed on Pillar 2, i.e. on expanded and active 
supervision. Supervisory authorities are expected to build up their expertise substantially in both 
quantitative and qualitative terms. In fact, supervisors are expected to work closely with the 
banks, when they develop and upgrade their internal risk-scoring models. This envisioned very 
close cooperation between banks and supervisors is naturally intended to reduce the information- 
and knowledge asymmetry between banks and supervisors. However, banks will always be able 
to make decisions based on private information. The intensified involvement of supervisors 
could instead lead to greater “regulatory capture” in the sense that supervisors identify 
themselves more strongly with the banks they supervise. 
     The implication of this discussion is that the need for market discipline as an instrument to 
induce banks to hold sufficient capital (in total or relatively) for their portfolios of risky asset is 
arguably stronger under the proposed new Basel II accord. By market discipline we mean that 
banks are given incentives by market participants’ choices of depository institutions to assign 
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costs of capital to credits reflecting the banks’ best evaluation of credit risk from the point of 
view of share- and debt holders including depositors. To a particular cost of capital for a loan 
corresponds a choice of debt and equity financing including a certain amount of equity held 
against a loan. If banks’ creditors are insured their choices of depository institutions will be less 
sensitive to perceptions about banks’ risk-taking. Therefore, shareholders have an incentive to 
use too much low cost debt financing to finance relatively risky loans. 
      Market discipline should also enhance incentives to compete by means of credit-
evaluation and pricing skills. Unintended underestimation of risk seems to have been an 
important element of banking crises in, for example, the Scandinavian countries and Japan. 
Regulators have generally been unable to detect this kind of underestimation. There is obviously 
no guarantee that market discipline resolves this problem, but it increases the likelihood that 
underestimation of risk can be detected by market participants since banks’ risk-taking and 
procedures for assessing credit would come under the scrutiny of a large number of observers 
with stakes in the banks. Ratings agencies naturally play a role as producers of information that 
uninsured depositors and other creditors demand.  
     The European Commission and the Basel Committee rely on information disclosure to 
enforce market discipline. However, effective market discipline requires not only that 
information is available to some observers, but also that the observers value the information, and 
are able to impose a cost on the bank that releases negative information (or abstains from 
releasing positive information). As long as depositors and other creditors of banks are insured, or 
implicitly expect to be bailed out, information about potential credit losses is not going to be a 
major concern to creditors. Another aspect is that the disclosed information is going to be more 
relevant and effective, if the choice of disclosed information is based on demand for information 
in the market place. 
      By putting their faith in rules for information disclosure alone to create market discipline, 
the European Commission and the Basel Committee neglect that the amount and truthfulness of 
information available in the market place depend on incentives on the demand as well as supply 
side for information. Demand for information is likely to influence both the quantity and the 
quality of information supplied by the banks themselves, ratings agencies and other analysts. 
         An indirect method for imposing market discipline is for regulators to use information in 
the market risk premium on an uninsured portion of the bank’s debt to assess a risk-premium on 
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claims of insured creditors. By requiring banks to issue a minimum amount of “credibly 
uninsured” subordinated debt regulators may obtain not only a discipline device, but also an 
information device for imposing costs on banks in proportion to asset risk.5 In principle the yield 
spread on subordinated debt could be used to determine a deposit insurance premium for the 
bank. The effective pricing of deposit insurance would essentially make capital requirements 
unnecessary even for banks that are “too big to fail”. An alternative route for the regulator is to 
use the information in the yield spread to adjust capital requirements and to intervene in the 
activities of banks approaching distress (“prompt corrective action”). 
            The arguments in favor of subordinated debt are based on the assumption that the 
subordination is credible and that the holders of subordinated debt will not be bailed out when a 
bank faces distress. Any other mechanism that would make banks’ creditors credibly non-insured 
would essentially have the same disciplinary effects as subordinated debt. In the following we 
argue that the credibility of non-insurance of holders of subordinated debt, as well as of non-
insured depositors, is enhanced substantially by the existence of well specified, ex ante 
determined insolvency procedures for banks. Deposit insurance, subordinated debt, and prompt 
corrective action procedures are aspects of insolvency procedures. 
          The role of insolvency procedures for financial firms is in principle the same as for non-
financial firms. There are important differences between banks and non-financial firms, however. 
First, banks supply liquidity. A large part of the liabilities of banks are very short term and they 
play an important role in the payment mechanism. These liabilities may be subject to bank runs 
if creditors fear non-repayment. Second, a large part of the short term liabilities are inter-bank 
liabilities that may contribute to contagion among banks if one bank fails. Third, creditors of 
banks in particular are diverse and many. Thus, banks do not generally have one or a few large 
creditors with a strong interest in resolution of distress. For non-financial firms a large creditor (a 
bank) often takes the lead in restructuring distressed firms informally or formally in countries 
with effective restructuring laws like Chapter 11 in the USA.6  
                                                 
5 Subordinated debt proposals were mentioned in footnote 2. Recently, the literature analyzing the proposals has 
been growing rapidly. Examples are Federal Reserve Board (1999 and 2000), Federal Reserve Board and 
Department of the Treasury (2000), Calomiris (1999), Evanoff and Wall (2000 and 2001), Sironi (2000a and 
2000b), and Benink and Benston (2001), and additional references below. 
 
6 See Wihlborg and Gangopadhyay with Hussain (2001) for a discussion of formal and informal insolvency 
procedures. 
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For the reasons mentioned regular bankruptcy law is not often applied in cases when 
banks face distress. The USA and a few other countries have implemented bank-specific 
insolvency procedures. Most other countries simply do not allow banks to fail. Although many 
economists have argued that the fear of contagion of a bank failure is exaggerated few 
governments are willing to test this belief.  
One response to the fear of contagion is deposit insurance. The USA with its relatively 
complete deposit insurance coverage is actually the country that seems most likely to allow 
banks to fail. Partial deposit insurance schemes, as the ones mandated in the EU, provide a level 
of protection for small investors but they may not substantially reduce the risk of contagion. 
Therefore, the governments’ incentives to bail out depositors, and even shareholders, remain.  
The recurrence of bank failures across the world suggests that a combination of 
preventive and remedial measures is needed. A regulatory authority facing an actual or perceived 
threat to the banking system is compelled to respond in order to eliminate the risk of bank runs. 
The authority or its government may bail out banks fully or partially—even nationalizing the 
banking sector, as in Norway in the late 1980s. Other solutions include (a) debt restructuring, (b) 
a mix of government and more or less voluntary private assistance, and (c) the creation of 
specialized agencies to take over bad loans, such as the Resolution Trust Corporation in the 
USA.  
        Even though these solutions may assist in restoring a functioning market, they tend to be 
assembled by regulators, central banks and governments in time of crises. Therefore, they fail to 
provide the sector with transparent, predictable consequences in cases of mismanagement or 
excessive risk-taking. When the crisis occurs the political pressures to resolve it by protecting 
strong interest groups are high. Ex ante knowledge of these political pressures lead to 
expectations of bail-outs. Thus, generally acceptable rules for resolving banking crises must be 
determined ex ante in order to make statements about a non-bail out policy credible. 
Furthermore, the non-bail out policy must be politically acceptable. This acceptability can be 
achieved by limiting the non-insurance of creditors to a certain amount per deposit, or by 
limiting the non-insurance to particular groups of creditors. 
   Transparent, pre- and well-specified insolvency procedures for banks could increase the 
credibility of no bail-out policies, enhance market discipline and thereby reduce the probability 
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of banks facing distress, and where distress occurs, prevent one bank’s failure to have contagion 
effects. 
          The European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (1998) proposed the following 
characteristics of distress resolution procedures to achieve the objectives discussed: 
1. There should be pre-specified trigger capital ratios for pre-specified 
regulatory or legal action (prompt corrective action). 
2. If a bank’s capital is depleted it must be closed and liquidation promptly 
initiated. This trigger point may actually be set at a positive capital ratio 
given uncertainty about asset values. 
3. Priority among creditors must be pre-specified in such a way that claims 
with high liquidity value are given priority.  
4. Valuation procedures should be made transparent. 
5. Since liquidation takes time, claims on banks with high liquidity value 
can remain liquid only if other banks or the central bank are organized ex 
ante to provide temporarily the liquidity held up during the liquidation 
process. Banks may have incentives to organize such arrangements, if 
clear liquidation procedures exist, but if they do not, then regulators must 
make sure that arrangements exist. 
6. The central bank should be prepared to provide exceptional liquidity only 
under conditions where a bank’s failure may create systemic problems. 
The lender of last resort function should not be extended to insolvent 
banks. 
7. The authorities managing a crisis must be made independent of ad hoc 
political pressures in order to enhance the credibility of the intervention 
process.  
 
3. Distress resolution procedures in Europe  
As noted few countries have administrative or legal rules specifying procedures for resolution of 
distress of a bank. The USA with its high coverage deposit insurance system has been leading in 
the creation and implementation of pre-specified rules. The Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 sets trigger capital ratios for specific “prompt 
corrective actions” by banks and regulatory authorities. There are four trigger points at which the 
FDIC in particular must take action or order the bank to take certain actions. The Fed’s ability to 
act as “Lender of Last Resort” has been strongly restricted unless there is substantial systemic 
risk. Questions remain, however, about the ability and willingness of the Fed and the FDIC to 
follow the prompt corrective action procedures if the bank in distress is considered “too big to 
fail”. 
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      The American procedures can be compared to Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code for non-
financial firms. This legislation is primarily aimed at restructuring rather than liquidation and the 
same can be said about the FDICIA. The legislation therefore has certain disadvantages in that it 
does not provide much guidance for liquidation of banks. Thereby, it does not provide strong 
incentives for private initiatives to enter contractual arrangements ex ante for how to resolve 
liquidity problems or inter-bank claim settlements. Nevertheless, it increases the credibility of 
both the insurance of depositors and the non-insurance of depositors beyond the pre-specified 
amounts. 
      Norway is another country with pre-specified distress resolution procedures for banks. 
Already before the Norwegian banking crisis there were rules for “public administration” of 
banks in distress. The procedures are more similar to liquidation procedures than to restructuring 
procedures and the distressed bank is not expected to remain under public administration for 
long. Perhaps because of the concentration of the Norwegian banking industry, no bank can be 
allowed to fail. As a result, the public administration procedures were not employed during the 
crisis in the late 80s. Instead the banks were nationalized- They were re-privatized again several 
years later. In spite of some revisions of the procedures after the banking crisis, the spirit of the 
law is unchanged. From the perspective of those responsible for financial system stability the 
procedures should be used as little as possible. Instead the Financial Supervisory Authority has 
obtained stronger powers to intervene when a bank approaches distress. This intervention is not 
strongly rule based as in the USA. 
       The Norwegian case illustrates that it is not merely the existence of pre-determined 
insolvency procedures matter. The banking industry in Norway--like in many other small 
countries--is dominated by few banks. Therefore, each bank tends to be “too big to fail” making 
any crisis systemic in the eyes of authorities. If so, liquidation of a distressed bank is not a 
politically acceptable alternative and liquidation procedures will not be enforced. Thereby, they 
lose credibility. 
        In the vast majority of countries there are no formal distress resolution procedures for 
banks. Regular bankruptcy laws apply in principle on banks In some countries insolvency law 
may include procedures that are particularly suitable for banks. In particular, the UK insolvency 
law includes a procedure called “administration” designed to enable reconstruction of a firm. An 
administrator can be appointed by either a group of creditors or a court. to lead a distressed firm 
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The administration procedures are similar to Chapter 11 in several ways except that the 
administrator takes over management functions.  In administration the firm is protected from 
actions by creditors while negotiations with creditors are ongoing. The intention of 
administration is to be short lived and the administrator can enter new agreements with the 
purpose of avoiding liquidation.  
    After 1997 the British FSA has been given strong authority to issue rules for banks with the 
purpose of ensuring financial stability. The FSA can force a bank to enter bankruptcy or 
administration proceedings. It has the right to issue opinions about the result of administration 
proceedings. The division of responsibility between the FSA, the Bank of England, and the 
Ministry of Finance has been specified in a “Memorandum of Understanding”.  However, the 
distress resolution procedures for the FSA are not as clearly rule based as in the USA. 
       The issue of crisis management for banks has been addressed by the EU. In particular, the 
coordination problem arising when an international bank faces distress has lead to some activity 
with respect to development of principles for crisis resolution. Since most major banks within the 
EU have some international activity, these principles are the closest the EU comes to insolvency 
procedures for banks. 
     In a “Report on Financial Crisis Management” the Economic and Financial Committee7  
states that “there is no blueprint for crisis management” and as a general principle “private 
institutions should be involved as much as possible in both crisis prevention and, if this fails, in 
crisis management……If financial losses occur, the firm’s shareholders should bear the costs 
and its management should suffer the consequences. For this reason, the winding down of the 
institution may be a sensible strategy.” EU crisis management procedures do not become more 
specific than this. 
   The report emphasizes information sharing, coordination, and solutions on a very general level. 
On the issue of coordination and the assignment of responsibility for decision making with 
respect to crisis management the report states that, “the presumption in international banking 
supervision is that the home country authorities are responsible for decisions on crisis 
management”. However, “The principle of home country control is not directly applicable to 
foreign subsidiaries, as the host country authorities are obliged to treat these as domestic 
institutions with their own legal identity. In the event of a crisis at a foreign subsidiary, the host 
                                                 
7 Economic Paper No 156, July 2001 form The Economic and Financial Committee 
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country supervisor – which is in fact the subsidiary’s home country supervisor – can take any 
preventive measure envisaged in this context.” Since most international activity takes place in 
subsidiaries there is very little guidance in these statements.  
        Other sections of the report refer to alternative solutions in a bank crisis. Private sector 
solutions are “preferred” but “Liquidity support might have to be granted in order to stabilise the 
troubled institution or the market as a whole in order ‘to buy time’. In a less 
volatile environment, public measures may then be considered, if the winding-down  of the 
institution is not a viable option.” Competitive implications of crisis management measures are 
also discussed in a separate section. 
          The implication for crisis management of these very general principles is that central 
banks, financial supervisors, and responsible ministries in home and host countries will become 
involved when a bank with international activities faces distress. Burden sharing easily becomes 
a major concern in negotiations rather than long-term consequences for incentives of 
stakeholders in banks. The lack of clear procedures in combination with the need to act quickly 
and the political incentives to protect depositor groups creates a system where the authorities are 
obliged to support the distressed bank. 
            As a country experiencing a severe banking crisis in the early 90s, Sweden has had a 
debate about distress resolution procedures during the 90s. The Swedish banking crisis was 
essentially resolved by the issuance of a blanket guarantee for all bank creditors. Even 
shareholders were indirectly bailed out by this guarantee. Before the crisis there was neither 
formal deposit insurance nor any bank distress resolution procedures. Depositors and other 
creditors were nevertheless correct in assuming that they were implicitly insured.  
        In 2000 a government committee proposed specific legislation for a separate insolvency law 
for banks, much in the spirit of the Shadow Committee proposal described above. Specifically, 
the proposal for “public administration” contained a mixture of the American and the Norwegian 
rules. Like the American FDICIA the purpose of the proposed procedures was primarily to make 
restructuring possible. Liquidation procedures were also clearly specified. For example, the 
liquidity problem was addressed directly. The proposal is “resting” after being positively 
received although some reservations on specifics were expressed by, for example, the Swedish 
FSA. 
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       The internationalization of Swedish banks have also created a need for “Memoranda of 
Understanding” between Swedish authorities and foreign authorities with respect to banking 
supervision The merger of four major Nordic banks into the pan-Nordic Nordea necessitated 
agreements among authorities in Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland. There is a Nordic 
Memorandum of Understanding and there is a specific Memorandum with respect to supervision 
of Nordea. Furthermore, the dominating ownership role of Swedish banks in Estonia has lead to 
a Memorandum of Understanding between the Estonian and the Swedish Financial Supervisory 
Authorities.  
          The principles laid down in the Nordic memoranda are similar to and refer to the EU 
principles discussed above, The Swedish Estonian memorandum refer more directly to “Crisis; 
bankruptcy; winding-up” in the following paragraph:   
“The Estonian and Swedish authorities shall inform each other, without delay, if they 
become aware of any pending crisis concerning particular credit institutions with cross-border 
establishments in the other country or if the crisis is limited to a particular cross-border 
establishment. Also crisis, which may indirectly affect credit institutions, shall be subject to the 
exchange of information. In either case, the host country authority shall collaborate with the 
home country authority if supervisory countermeasures are to be taken by the latter. Moreover, 
the host country maintains the right to apply its own procedures concerning the winding up and 
reorganization of cross-border establishments to cross-border establishments that are on the 
verge of bankruptcy.” 
         These principles with respect to crisis management are hardly more transparent than those 
for the EU as a whole. If a crisis occurs, ad hoc solutions must be developed quickly in 
committees including central banks, financial supervisors and ministries in the countries 
concerned. 
         The conclusion of this overview of insolvency procedures for banks in Europe is that 
transparent rules that could enhance the credibility of non-insurance of creditor groups are 
lacking. There is also little variation across countries. There is some variation in terms of 
independence of supervisory authorities and more general institutional quality reflecting, for 
example, the efficiency of the legal system with respect to contract enforcement. These 
institutional characteristics may have an impact on, for example, the degree to which “private 
solutions” will be sought in line with the stated principles of the EU. In the empirical section 
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below we ask whether institutional characteristics of EU countries affect the credibility of non-
insurance of banks’ creditors.  
 
4. Testing for the relationship between credibility of non-insurance and market discipline 
We test the effect of the credibility of non-insurance on the market discipline in the 
banking sector by using a sample of 17 European countries during the period 1985-2003. 
Following Angkinand and Wihlborg (2005), AW in the following, we measure the extent of 
market discipline by using country-level data for the probability of banking crises, which is 
expected to be higher for a country that lacks market discipline. Lacking a direct proxy for 
credibility of non-insurance we argue as in the mentioned paper that there is a U-shaped 
relationship between credibility of non-insurance and explicit deposit insurance coverage. Thus 
we also expect U-shaped relationships between degree of moral hazard and explicit deposit 
insurance coverage, and between the probability of banking crisis and explicit deposit insurance 
coverage. Figure 1 from AW illustrates the hypothesized relationships. 
 
FIG. 1 here 
The U-shaped curve in the figure can be viewed as the vertical sum of an upward sloping relation 
between explicit deposit insurance and moral hazard at a given level of implicit guarantees, and a 
downward sloping relation showing how the credibility of non-insurance declines with lower 
explicit coverage. Extensive non-insurance has no credibility.  In other words, if explicit deposit 
insurance is non-existent or very low, moral hazard will be high. The reason is that. fear of 
contagion in a crisis, as well as considerations of consumer protection, compels authorities to 
intervene rapidly to guarantee depositors’ funds by bailing out the bank. Thereby it can remain in 
operation. Shareholders may or may not be bailed out but depositors will. A common response in 
this situation is to issue a blanket guarantee to all creditors. On the other hand, if explicit deposit 
insurance is complete or nearly so, the moral hazard will be generated by the explicit insurance 
itself. Credible non-insurance requires partial insurance of depositors. The coverage must be high 
enough that the non-insurance does not have severe political ramifications and that contagious 
bank runs are not likely to occur. 
          Angkinand and Wihlborg (2005) find that the implied positive quadratic relationship 
between probability of banking crisis and explicit deposit insurance coverage is significant in a 
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panel data analysis of banking crises in 140 countries, as well as sub-samples, for the period 
1985-2003. In this paper we focus on 17 European countries covered by available data. 
Hypothesis 1: The probability of banking crisis (reflecting strength of moral hazard incentives) 
in individual European countries is minimized at an intermediate level of explicit deposit 
insurance coverage, where the credibility of non-insurance of some creditor groups is high.  
We have argued that insolvency procedures could enhance the credibility of non-
insurance but we cannot test this proposition directly since there is no variation across the 
countries with respect to this variable. We will introduce other institutional characteristics that 
may influence the credibility of non-insurance below. In the figure higher credibility of non-
insurance at a given level of explicit coverage causes the U-shaped curve to shift down and more 
so for low levels of explicit coverage where the credibility is very low. 
Hypothesis 2. Institutional characteristics, such as the existence of ex ante insolvency 
procedures for banks, contributing to credibility of non-insurance reduces the probability of 
banking crisis for a given level of explicit insurance coverage, and the reduction is greater the 
lower the level of explicit coverage. 
       There exists a substantial literature on the relationship between deposit insurance, the 
probability of banking crisis, and the output costs of banking crises. This literature is reviewed in 
AW.8 It suffices to note that most empirical studies indicate that the probability of banking crisis 
is an increasing function of deposit insurance coverage. The relationship is not always 
significant, however. Output costs of banking crises, on the other hand, tend to be declining with 
higher explicit coverage but this result is controversial. The results in AW confirm that if the 
analysis is constrained to a linear relation between probability of banking crisis and explicit 
deposit insurance coverage then a positive relationship is found but if the quadratic formulation 
is allowed for, then the U-shaped relation is obtained. 
        Angkinand (2005) analyses the impact of institutional variables such as Law and Order, 
Supervisory Power, and Corruption on the relationship between probability of banking crisis and 
deposit insurance. She finds limited but significant impact of some institutional variables. For 
example, corruption tends to be positively associated with banking crisis. We return to 
institutional variables when Hypothesis 2 is tested below.. 
                                                 
8 Examples are Angkinand (2005), Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 2002), Demirguc-Kunt and Kane (2002), 
Eichengreen and Areta (2000), Gropp and Vesala(2001), Hoggarth and Redhill (2003), Honohan and Klingebiel 
(2003), Hutchison and McDill (1998) and Nier(2004) 
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We turn now to empirical methodology and data. Following AW logit regressions are 
estimated on the following banking crisis model: 
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tiBC , is a banking crisis dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 in a crisis year, and 0 
if there is no banking crisis. ln[Pi,t /1-Pi,t] is the odd ratio of the Logit estimation, where Pi,t is the 
probability that a banking crisis occurs, or when tiBC , equals to 1. The subscript i refers to a 
country and t indicates time. To test our U-shaped relationship hypothesis, we enter the variables 
for explicit deposit insurance coverage (DI), in a banking crisis regression in a quadratic 
functional form. If there is evidence supporting the hypothesis of the U-shaped relationship, then 
the estimated coefficient of squared term (δ2) should be positive and significant, and the 
estimated coefficient of linear term (δ1) should be negative and significant.  
The banking crisis dummy is obtained from the World Bank data base used in most of the 
empirical work on the subject.9 The judgement of whether a country has had a banking crisis or 
not a particular year is somewhat subjective. The crisis must have been serious enough to have 
had a potential impact on GDP but it need not have been systemic.10 We will actually distinguish 
between systemic banking crises and those that were not considered systemic by the World Bank 
analysts. 
In the equations above, x is a k-element vector of control variables; real GDP per capita, 
real GDP growth rate, the ratio of money supply to international reserves, the ratio of domestic 
credit provided by banking sector to GDP, and the ratio of current account to GDP. The current 
account surplus is expected to reduce the probability of crises. The ratio of M2 to foreign 
reserves and the growth rate of the ratio of domestic credit to GDP are expected to have a 
positive relationship with the probability of crises. The increase in the money supply relative to 
reserves and the credit growth rate reflects the expansion of credits that may contribute to 
                                                 
9  See Caprio and Klingebiel 2003. 
10 The failure of one of thousands of small, US commercial banks or of a very local German Sparkasse would not 
constitute and banking crisis. 
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unsustainable rise in assets prices and the bank exposure to foreign exchange risk, which may 
increase the likelihood of financial crises11. iε is the error term. 
We also test whether the credibility of non-insured deposits can be enhanced in a country 
with strong institutional environments including prudent financial regulation and supervision, 
independence of political pressure, and high quality of domestic institutions. We test this 
hypothesis from the following model specifications:  
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          Each regression includes the same set of control variables previously discussed, each 
institutional variable, and the interaction term between an institutional variable and the squared 
term of partial deposit insurance variable12.  The positive summation of φ and δ2  indicates the U-
shaped relationship between the probability of crises and the extent of deposit insurance 
coverage. If a strong institutional environment increases the credibility of non-insured depositors 
as Hypothesis 2 suggests, the expected negative impact on the probability of banking crisis 
should be revealed trough a negative φ and a negative φ..  
 
5. Data  
Summary statistics for the non-institutional variables are presented in Table 1, dates of banking 
crises in the 17 countries are presented in Table 4 and characteristics of the deposit insurance 
systems and the financial regulatory environment are shown in Table 5.                                                         
Data on Banking Crises 
The country-level data for banking crisis dates for 17 European countries between 1985-
2003 are from Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), who compile the data based on the published 
financial sources and interviews with experts (see Table 4). We use the data of banking crises, 
which is classified into both systemic and non-systemic (i.e. smaller or borderline) crises. A 
systemic banking crisis is defined as the situation when much or all of bank capital is exhausted, 
and a non-systemic or smaller banking crisis is identified when there is evidence of significant 
banking problems such as a government intervention in banks and financial institutions.  
 
                                                 
11 A lag of the ratio of current account to GDP and credit growth are used in the estimation.    
12 The interaction term between an institutional variable and the linear term of partial deposit insurance variable is 
not included, since it leads to the failure of the prediction in logit regressions.  
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Data on Partial Deposit Insurance 
Data for deposit insurance variables is from the database of Deposit Insurance around the 
World published by Demirgüç-Kunt and Sobaci (2000) at the World Bank13. We use three 
variables to capture the partial extent of coverage limit of deposit insurance. The first variable, 
called the comprehensive deposit insurance, is constructed by aggregating dummy variables of 
various designs of deposit insurance coverage. These dummies are the foreign currency deposits 
covered (which is equal 1 for explicit deposit insurance that protects foreign currency deposits, 
and 0 otherwise), the interbank deposits covered (which is equal 1 for explicit insurance that 
protects interbank deposits, and 0 otherwise), and the no-coinsurance dummy (which is equal 1 if 
the explicit system has no coinsurance, and 0 otherwise). The second variable is Coverage per 
GDP (or CovGDP), which measures the coverage limit per deposit relative to GDP per capita, 
and the third variable is Coverage per Deposit (CovDeposit), which measures the coverage limit 
per deposit relative to total deposits per GDP per capita14. Table 4 reports deposit insurance data 
for 17 European countries in our sample.  
 
Data for Bank Regulation and Supervision, Institutional Quality, and Political Independence 
Variables 
We use variables to measure institutional environments from two datasets: the database of 
Regulation and Supervision of Banks around the World, compiled by Barth, et al. (2004), and the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). These variables are separated into three groups. For 
each variable a higher value indicates a stronger institutional environments. The first group 
measures characteristics of financial regulation and supervision. Three variables are employed 
from Barth, et al.’s dataset. These variables are prompt corrective power (PCP), which indicates 
the existence of bank solvency trigger points for intervention and the authorities’ power to 
intervene, official supervisory power (Ospower), which measures the extent of supervisory 
authority power in taking actions to prevent and resolve financial problems, and capital 
                                                 
13 The data for the ratio of coverage limit per GDP and the ratio of coverage limit to deposits is taken from 
Claessens, Klingebiel and Laeven (2004), who also construct these variables based on the World Bank Deposit 
Insurance database. 
14 For observations prior to the establishment of a formal deposit insurance system (the database of Deposit 
Insurance contains the dates in which a formal explicit deposit insurance system was established across countries in 
each country), the dummy for partial deposit insurance is assigned a value of zero, indicating the potential existence 
of implicit deposit guarantee. 
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regulatory index (Crindex), which captures the extent of capital requirement stringency15,16.  The 
variables in the second group capture the extent of independence of crisis management from ad 
hoc political pressures. Two variables are court involvement (Courtinv) and political 
independence of supervisory authority (Indpoli). These variables are also from Barth, et al.’s 
dataset and shown in Table 5. The last group measures the quality of domestic institutions, which 
are rule of law (Law), corruption (Corrupt), and bureaucratic quality (Bureaucracy). These 
variables are compiled by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 17.  
The data for economic and financial variables, which are controlled in the models, are 
from the International Financial Statistics and World Development Indicators, the World Bank.  
 
6. Empirical Results for the Probability of Banking Crisis and Explicit Deposit Insurance 
Table 2 reports regression results for the effect of explicit deposit insurance coverage on the 
probability of banking crises. The three variables for partiality of explicit deposit insurance, 
which are defined in section 4, enter the regressions in both a linear and quadratic functional 
form. The regression in column 1 shows that the 0/1 dummy for explicit deposit insurance alone 
does not explain the likelihood of banking crises for the sample of European countries during the 
period of 1985-200318. All European countries have explicit deposit insurance systems towards 
the end of the period but not throughout the estimation period.beginning in 1985. Columns 2-7 
reports regression result when taking into account the cross-country difference of deposit 
insurance coverage. Columns 2, 4 and 6 show the results with linear specification as in most of 
the literature. For all proxies of coverage the coefficient for explicit coverage is positive and 
significant. However, when the quadratic term is introduced in columns 3, 5 and 7 the linear term 
becomes negative for two proxies for explicit coverage and very small and insignificant in the 
third case (column 7). At the same time the quadratic term enters positively in all three cases and 
significantly for two proxies of explicit coverage in columns 3 and 5. Thus, the hypothesized 
                                                 
15 The official supervisory power variable is scaled 0-16, based on 16 surveyed questions; higher score indicates 
greater supervisory power. The capital regulatory index is scaled 0-9 on the basis of 9 survey questions. 
16 The data from Barth, et al. is primarily available from 1999, so the extent of regulations and supervisions is 
assumed not varying overtime. Barth, et al. also compile historical data for some regulation and supervision 
variables and find that those variables have only marginal change over time.  
17 The rule of law and corruption variables are scaled 0-6. The bureaucratic quality variable is scaled 0-4. 
18  The negative sign of estimated coefficient of the explicit deposit insurance dummy is consistent with Gropp and 
Vesala (2001). They use the sample of European countries and find that explicit deposit insurance systems decrease 
banks’ risk-taking incentives. For a country with implicit deposit insurance 
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quadratic relationship is strongly supported when explicit deposit insurance coverage is 
measured by the comprehensive deposit insurance variable and by coverage limit per GDP per 
capita (CovGDP). When using the coverage limit per deposit (CovDeposit) the coefficients still 
imply a U-shaped curve (i.e. the linear term has a negative sign and the squared term has a 
positive sign), but these estimates are not significant. In addition, by looking at the goodness of 
fit of the models, the Wald chi-square test points to the superiority of the quadratic estimation. 
For control variables, the coefficients of real GDP growth rate and the ratio of current account to 
GDP are negative and statistically significant suggesting that on average countries with high 
economic growth and a current account surplus experience lower probabilities of banking crises.  
          Figure 2 shows the U-shaped relationship for the European countries. In Fig 2a the 
coverage limit per GDP/capita (covgdp) measures coverage of explicit insurance. In Fig 2b the 
Comprehensive DI proxy consisting of a summation of dummy variables is used.. It can be seen 
that the minimum probability of crisis occurs for a value of 1 for Comprehensive DI and a value 
slightly below 2 for covgdp. The mean Comprehensive DI-value for the countries is 1.4 as shown 
in Table 1 while the mean covgdp value is 1.74. Thus, the probability of banking crisis in Europe 
could be reduced by a reduction of the types of deposits covered by insurance, while the 
coverage limit per deposit seems close to the minimum point.  
Regression results in Table 3 explore institutional environments that might contribute to 
the increasing credibility of non-insured deposits and then market discipline. Each regression 
includes the same economic and financial variable as those used in table (2), but they are not 
reported. In each case explicit coverage is captured by the comprehensive DI proxy.  
Columns 1-3 focus on the regulation and supervision in the financial sector. The 
significant positive coefficients for prompt corrective power (PCP) and capital regulation index 
(Crindex) alone do not support the hypothesis that stronger corrective action power and capital 
requirement stringency reduce the probability of banking crisis. However, the significant 
negative coefficients for the variables when they interact with the squared term for explicit 
coverage indicates that the U-shaped relationship between the probability of crisis and the 
coverage of explicit deposit insurance becomes flatter in countries with stronger corrective action 
powers and capital requirement stringency. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 2. Increased 
flatness can be interpreted to mean that changes in explicit coverage have less of an effect on 
implicit insurance and the credibility of non-insurance.  
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Turning to the other institutional variables we observe that higher quality of rule of law 
and higher quality of the bureaucracy also increase the flatness of the quadratic relationship but 
these variables surprisingly shift the probability of crisis upward. The estimated coefficients for 
the interactive terms remain negative, although insignificant, when the squared comprehensive 
DI is interacted with official supervisory power, court involvement, political independence of 
supervisory authority, and corruption variables. These results for the institutional variables and 
therefore for Hypothesis 2 are not very strong. It is possible that there is not sufficient variation 
among the 17 European countries to identify significant effects.  
All results so far refer to Western Europe since data Eastern Europe exist only for recent 
years. Nevertheless, as a final exercise we want to compare the relationship between probability 
of banking crisis and explicit deposit insurance coverage in Western and Eastern Europe. For this 
purpose we compare our results presented in Figure 2 with results for emerging market 
economies estimated in Angkinand and Wihlborg (2005). We assume that these results are valid 
for Eastern European countries. Then we plug in actual values for all variables except deposit 
insurance coverage for a group of Eastern European countries and draw the curve describing the 
relationship between probability of banking crisis and coverage of explicit deposit insurance for 
these countries. Figure 3 shows the emerging market relation using data for Estonia, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia Republic, and Slovenia.  
Comparing Figures 2 and 3 it can be seen that the minimum probability of banking crisis 
is much lower in Western (0.03) than in Eastern Europe (0.25) as we would expect. Furthermore, 
the explicit deposit insurace coverage that minimizes the probability of banking crisis is lower in 
Eastern than in Western Europe. For the comprehensive DI proxy based on dummies for types of 
depositors we can actually not identify the minimum probability point, but for the covgdp proxy 
the minimum probability in Eastern Europe occurs when covgdp takes a value below 1.The 
corresponding minimum probability coverage in Western Europe in Figure 2a close to 2. 
The difference between Eastern and Western European banking systems is substantial 
since the Eastern European systems are still relatively immature. Also, the instutional framework 
is weaker. These differences explain the higher minimum probabilities in Eastern Europe. It may 
seem surprising, however, that the explicit deposit insurance coverage that minimizes the 
probability of banking crisis is lower in Eastern Europe. This observation would imply that 
credibility of non-insurance is obtained at a relatively low level of explicit deposit insurance 
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coverage. In other words, lack of explicit coverage does not cause expectations of bail-outs to the 
same degree in Eastern as in Western Europe. This difference is not explained by differences in 
ex ante distress resolution procedures but it may be explained by a greater political acceptability 
of losses for depositors in Eastern Europe.  
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
We have argued that bank risk taking and credit allocation can be made more efficient by means 
of enhanced market discipline. Strong market discipine in the banking system requires that there 
are groups of creditors of banks that are credibly non-insured. Such credibility requires 
transparent ex ante determined distress resolution procedures for banks and a politically 
acceptable level of non-insurance. An overview of distress resolution procedures for banks in 
Europe reveal that they are generally not rule based. Therefore, a sudden banking crisis is likely 
to be met with ad hoc measures that often include blanket guarantees of creditors or bail-outs of 
distressed banks. We argue that the lower the coverage of explicit deposit insurance the stronger 
is the implicit insurance. On these grounds we hypothesize that there is an intermediate level of 
explicit deposit insurance coverage that maximizes the credibility of non-insurance of groups of 
creditors. At this level market discipine is relatively strong, moral hazard incentives relatively 
weak and the probability of banking crisis relatively low. Thus, we expect a U-shaped relation 
between explicit deposit insurance coverage and the probability of banking crisis. 
        In the empirical part of the paper the U-shaped relationship is confirmed for 17 Western 
European countries using data for the period 1985-2003. We take this as evidence that there is an 
intermediate level of explicit deposit insurance coverage that minimizes the probability of 
banking crisis by maximizing the credibility of non-insurance of of groups of depositors and 
other creditors of banks. 
       In a comparison of Eastern and Western Europe we found that the minimum probability of 
banking crisis is higher in Eastern than in Western Europe, and that the explicit deposit insurance 
coverage that minimizes the probability of crisis is lower in Eastern than in Western Europe.  
        Institutional variables describing powers of financial supervisors to take corrective action 
for distressed banks and powers to intervene more generally to influence banks’ risk taking, as 
well as variables descibing the quality of legal and political institutions were introduced to test 
the hypothesis that the credibility of non-insurance of creditors increases with transparency of 
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rules for supervisors and legal enforcement. The results for these variables were weak, perhaps 
because there is not sufficient variation in these qualities among the Western European countries, 
or because the number of countries included in the study is insufficient to identify influences of 
institutions. A few variables capturing quality of institutions were found to reduce the impact of 
changes in explicit deposit insurance coverage on the credibility of non-insurance. This result is 
consistent with our hypothesis but the same quality variables were found to increase the 
probability of banking crisis in contradiction to our hypothesis. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Banking Crisis Dummy 323 0.1207 0.3263 0 1 
Real GDP Per Capita† 306 250.8519 88.8819 74.7131 468.9491 
Real GDP Growth Rate 306 0.0266 0.0220 -0.0597 0.1119 
M2 to Reserve 312 0.1342 0.0972 0.0280 0.5537 
Credit Growth t-1 312 0.0286 0.1515 -0.5437 1.5374 
CA to GDP t-1 322 0.0047 0.0392 -0.1044 0.1563 
Explicit DI 323 0.8916 0.3113 0 1 
Comprehensive DI 323 1.4056 0.6777 0 2 
Compreh. DI × Compreh. DI 323 2.4334 1.6393 0 4 
Coverage per GDP 323 1.7316 1.9611 0 7.60 
CovGDP × CovGDP 323 6.8325 15.0353 0 57.76 
Coverage per Deposit 323 2.6665 3.3633 0 11.80 
CovDeposit × CovDeposit 323 18.3867 41.6636 0 139.24 
 
Comprehensive DI (Compreh. DI) = interbank + foreign currency + no coinsurance 
Coverage per GDP (CovGDP) = coverage limit-to-GDP per capita 
Coverage per Deposit (CovDeposit) = coverage limit-to-total deposits per GDP per capita  
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Table 2. Resuts of logit analysis of the probability of banking crisis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Constant -0.1700 0.8782 
-1.0857 
1.0439 
-0.8210 
1.0239 
-0.7727 
0.8417 
-0.0901 
1.0325 
-0.6802 
0.8378 
-0.5350 
0.9961 
Real GDP per capita -0.0018 0.0026 
-0.0024 
0.0028 
-0.0003 
0.0029 
-0.0038 
0.0032 
-0.0051 
0.0034 
-0.0051 
0.0034 
-0.0052 
0.0035 
Real GDP growth rate -20.4190** 8.7667 
-19.8724** 
9.0030 
-16.5436* 
10.1120 
-23.7949** 
10.2619 
-24.5273** 
10.0246 
-23.9234** 
10.2670 
-24.1629** 
10.1152 
M2 to Reserve -6.4340 4.2916 
-6.1013 
4.1060 
-5.1488 
4.1121 
-3.9460 
3.3444 
-2.5020 
3.5621 
-2.8055 
3.1861 
-2.5136 
3.2710 
Credit Growth t-1 
-2.3377 
1.5483 
-2.2790 
1.5192 
-1.3902 
0.9985 
-3.2691* 
1.8476 
-3.3261* 
1.9065 
-3.1221 
1.8413* 
-3.2244* 
1.8850 
CA to GDP t-1 
-13.3795** 
6.6454 
-16.5287** 
6.8539 
-21.7532*** 
7.3776 
-16.7421** 
6.8143 
-17.0281* 
6.7944 
-17.1325** 
6.8465 
-17.4000** 
6.8094 
No. of Banks 0.0019* 0.0010 
0.0015 
0.0010 
0.0014 
0.0009 
-0.0004 
0.0010 
-0.0002 
0.0011 
-0.0017 
0.0011 
-0.0018 
0.0012 
Explicit DI -0.3314 0.4997       
Comprehensive DI  0.5452 
12% 
0.3501 
-4.2947*** 
1.3553     
Compreh. DI × Compreh. 
DI   
2.2478*** 
0.6405     
Coverage per GDP    0.3855*** 0.0881 
-0.3245 
0.4379   
CovGDP × CovGDP     0.0934* 0.0553   
Coverage per Deposit      0.2978*** 0.0573 
0.1786 
0.3076 
CovDeposit × CovDeposit       0.0099 0.0243 
No. of observations 289 289 289 289 289 289 289 
% correctly predicted 86.51% 87.51% 88.24% 88.24% 87.54% 88.58% 88.58% 
Wald Chi-Square  27.14 31.22 38.73 48.47 51.80 54.82 56.45 
Prob > Chi-Square   0.0003 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.1143 0.1296 0.2020 0.1835 0.1990 0.2117 0.2127 
Log-Likelihood -101.2812 -99.5350 -91.2577 -93.3663 -91.5958 -90.1468 -90.0328 
*, **, *** indicate significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors of estimated coefficients (robust standard error for OLS estimation). Subscripts t-
1 indicates the value of variable enters regression with one year and average two years preceding crisis year, respectively.      
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Table 3 Results of logit analysis for explicit deposit insurace coverage and institutional variables (control variables are not reported) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Comprehensive DI -5.5041*** 1.3052 
-4.4049** 
1.7528 
-4.6498*** 
1.5607 
-3.9166*** 
1.2544 
-4.2337*** 
1.4262 
-4.7004*** 
1.4099 
-3.8945*** 
1.3478 
-3.2569** 
1.4054 
Comp DI-square 2.9276*** 0.6224 
2.5960** 
1.2891 
3.1802*** 
0.9129 
2.2518*** 
0.5886 
2.3316*** 
0.7291 
2.3458*** 
0.9426 
2.0850** 
0.8572 
0.7298 
1.1014 
PCP × Comp DI-square -0.1581** 0.0815   
     
PCP 0.5031*** 0.1943   
     
Ospower× Comp DI-square  -0.0293 0.0608  
     
Ospower  0.1223 0.2406  
     
Crindex × Comp DI-square   -0.1387** 0.0597
     
Crindex   0.4162** 0.2021
     
Courtinv × Comp DI-square    -0.1608 0.2356 
    
Courtinv    -0.2559 0.8871 
    
Indpoli × Comp DI-square     -0.2779 0.2395    
Indpoli     0.5816 0.8505    
Law × Comp DI-square      0.7162 0.3843   
Law      0.7162* 0.3843   
Corrupt × Comp DI-square       -0.0040 0.1461  
Corrupt       0.5792 0.6074  
Bureaucracy × Comp DI-square        0.3063 0.2085
Bureaucracy        -1.1872* 0.6599
No. of observations 289 289 253 289 289 277 277 277 
% correctly predicted 88.58% 88.58% 88.54% 87.54% 87.89% 86.28% 88.09% 88.09% 
Wald Chi-Square  47.49 52.63 33.89 43.00 48.60 40.23 37.72 37.82 
Prob > Chi-Square   0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.2108 0.2044 0.1958 0.2144 0.2081 0.2126 0.2012 0.2112 
Log-Likelihood -90.2452 -90.9758 -77.2433 -89.8351 -90.5601 -88.6359 -89.9229 -88.8034 
Comp DI-square = Comprehsive.DI × Comprehsive DI; PCP = Prompt Corrective Power; Crindex = Capital Requirement Index; Ospower = Official Supervisory Power
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Table 4. Dates of Banking Crises, 1985-2003 
 
 
Country Systemic Banking Crises Nonsystemic Banking Crises 
Austria - - 
Belgium - - 
Denmark - 1987-1992 
Finland 1991-1994 - 
France - 1994-1995 
Germany - - 
Greece - 1991-1995 
Iceland - 1985-1986, 1993 
Ireland - - 
Italy - 1990-1995 
Netherlands - - 
Norway 1987-1993 - 
Portugal - 1986-1989 
Spain 1985 - 
Sweden 1991  
Switzerland - - 
The United Kingdom - - 
 
 Source: Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) 
Table 5. Designs of Explicit Deposit Insurance System and Characteristics of the 
Financial Regulatory Environment. 
 
 
Date 
En-
acted 
For’n 
Curr 
Dep 
Inter
-
bank 
dep 
Co-
insur
ance 
Cov 
per 
GDP 
Cov. 
per 
Dep
osit 
Blanket 
Guaran
tee 
DI
Fu
nds 
Prompt 
Corr. 
Power 
Cap’l 
Regu-
latory 
Index 
Official 
Super-
visory 
Power 
Austria 1979 yes no yes 0.9 1.1 no n/a 5 10 13 
Belgium 1974 yes no no 1 1 no n/a 0 6 10 
Denm-k 1988 yes no no 
1.2 2.3 yes 0.1
7 2 8 9 
Finland 1969 yes no no 
1 2.1 1993-
98 0.3 1 5 6 
France 1980 yes no no 3.1 4.6 yes n/a 0 4 7 
Germ-y 1966 yes no yes 0.9 1 yes n/a 0 6 9 
Greece 1993 yes no no 
0 0 no 0.2
7 0 7 12 
Iceland 1985 yes no yes 
0.7 1.8 no 0.0
1 3 6 5 
Ireland 1989 yes no yes 0.9 1 no 0.2 0 4 11 
Italy 1987 yes no no 
6 11.4 1993-
01 n/a 0 5 7 
N-lands 1979 yes no no 0.9 0.9 no n/a 0 7 5 
Norway 1961 yes no no 7.6 11.8 yes 2 1 n/a 9 
Portugal 1992 yes no yes 0 0 no 0.3 0 7 14 
Spain 1977 yes no no 1.5 1.9 no 0.3 3 10 9 
Sweden 1996 yes no no 
0 0 1992-
96 1 0 3 8 
Sw-land 1984 no no no 0.5 0.42 no n/a 0 n/a 14 
U.K. 1982 yes no yes 1.3 1.2 no n/a 0 6 11 
 
Source: the World Bank Deposit Insurance database. Coverage per GDP is the ratio of coverage limit 
per deposit to GDP per capita; Coverage per Deposit is the ratio of coverage limit per deposit to total 
deposits per capita (data is available at 2000 & from Laeven, 2004). Data for blanket guarantee is from 
Garcia (2000) and the World Bank database of Financial Regulation and Supervision, compiled by 
Barth, et al. This information comes from the survey question “Were any deposits not explicitly 
covered by deposit insurance at the time of the failure compensated when the bank failed?” 
Di-Funds = Deposit Insurance Funds-to-Total Bank Assets (%) 
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Figure 1. The Relationship Between Explicit Deposit Insurance, Credibility of 
Non- Insurance and Banking Crises 
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Absence of explicit deposit 
insurance leads to a high 
probability of banking 
crises because implicit 
guarantees are strong 
leading to low credibility of 
non-insurance.  
High explicit deposit 
insurance implies by 
definition that there is little 
non-insurance and therefore 
high moral hazard and high 
probability of banking 
crisis. 
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Figure 2 The Predicted Probability of Banking Crises and Coverage of Explicit 
Deposit Insurance. Western European Countries, 1985-2003 
 
Fig.2a. Explicit deposit insurance coverage measured as coverage- gdp per capita 
ratio 
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Fig 2b. Explicit deposit insurance coverage measured as comprehensiveness in terms 
of deposit types (range 1-4). 
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Figure 3. The Predicted Probability of Banking Crises and the Coverage of 
Explicit Deposit Insurance. Eastern European Countries Based on Coefficient 
Estimates for Emerging Market Economies in Angkinand and Wihlborg 2005 
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Note: 1.) Eastern European countries include Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia Republic, and 
Slovenia. The predicted values are estimated based a sample of 35 emerging market economies.  
2.) Covgdp is the ordinal data of deposit insurance coverage to GDP per capita. The value of this variable is 
assigned based on a value of the coverage to GDP per capita ratio, which is  equal to 0 if there is no explicit 
deposit insurance coverage, 1 if the coverage to GDP per capita ratio is between  (0,5), 1.5 if the coverage to GDP 
per capita ratio is between  [5,10), 2 if the coverage to GDP per capita ratio is between  [10,15), 2.5 if the coverage 
to GDP per capita ratio is greater than or equal 15, 3 if there is blanket deposit guarantee.  
3.) Comprehensive DI variable is the summation of four dummy variables:  
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